|Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Read III 202
Knowledge/Read: from knowledge follows truth.
Sainsbury V 141
Knowledge paradox/unexpected examination/Sainsbury: it does not matter that the students might have expectations which they are not entitled to have.
It is precisely because we believe that we have refused the teacher, and that we have thus taken away the opportunity from her to let the work be written, makes the announcement come true again. Variant: the class knows of the truth of the announcement. Then n can show the class that she cannot know that it is true.
Variant: the announcement also contains the fact that the class does not know because of the announcement ... - E.g. A1 "You will not know on the morning in question ..." - questionable principle: "If you know ... then you know, that one knows it. "- N.B.: a paradox occurs only when we have to conclude on W(A1).
Variant: Announcement: A2 either [M and non-WM (If A2, then M)] or [D and non-WD (If A2, then D)] - New: this is self-referential - Problem: then you know on Tuesday (If A2, then D) that A2 is wrong.V V 150
Real knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: A3 W (non-A3) e.g. the man knows that the announcement is wrong -that is how we come to MV 3 (...) inter alia: "What is proved is known". - MV 3:
1. Assumed, A3
2. W (non-A3) (definition of A3)
3. Non-A3 (which is known is true)
4. If A3, then non-A3 - (1-3 combined)
5. Non-A3 (after 4.)
6. Non-W (non A3) (according to 5. + definition of A3)
7. W (non-A3) - (5. + what is proved is known). - 6 and 7 contradict each other.
Locus classicus: Montague/Kaplan.
Believe paradox/Sainsbury: G1 a does not believe what G1 says - if a G1 believes, then he can understand that he says something wrong. - Contains two assumptions:
1) that a can understand that G1 is false, if he believes in it, and true, if he does not believe in it.
2) that a will understand what he can understand - now one can construct through inserting of rationality, self-consciousness, as well as unity and understanding, the paradox analogously to the paradox of knowledge.
Self-consciousness: If G(f), then G[G(f)]. - Reasonableness: If G(f) then non-G (non-G). - Closure: If G (if f, then y) and G (non-y), then G (non-f). - Although believe does not involve knowledge, one can construct the same paradox.
Knowledge/believe/knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: there is a discussion as to whether knowledge or belief should be correctly represented by an operator or a predicate. - e.g. Operator: A1 is true. - e.g. predicative: it will have to do with names of expressions, rather than with their use. - Montague/Kaplan: predicative version, to rule out that operators are to blame._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993