|Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Stroud I 105f
Knowledge/proof of existence/existence/Hume/Stroud: two principles:
1. No one knows of the existence of something when it is not perceived directly by someone> Apprehension: unordered) or he knows what he has perceived directly, is a sign of the existence of this thing.
2. No one can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he has not perceived these two things (thing and sign) directly. (> Acquaintance)
MooreVsHume: both principles are wrong: E.g. I know that this pencil exists. - According to Hume I could not know that, so they are wrong. - This is a reductio ad absurdum.
StroudVsMoore: Hume's principles are valid. - Moore: for him it is relevant what is safe, the pencil or the principles. - Skepticism/Stroud/(s): but is not a question of safety._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984