Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 63
Knowledge/Antiquity/Chisholm: Knowledge requires an identity between the knowing and the known object - Chisholm dito primary form of reference requires identity: self-attribution.
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I 142f
Knowledge/Cognitive Theory/Chisholm: from pondering what is more sensible: trust cognitive abilities until objections are present - epistemically clear, if unquestioned by unjustified (weak) - epistemically acceptable: more rational than the contrary.
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I 146
Epistemic Principle 6: something is epistemically clear if it is epistemically acceptable.
Epistemic Principle 7: in self-presenting property: if clear and considered, then evident - then contact with reality.
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I 148
Epistemic Principle 8
Principle of perception: if epistemically clear, then beyond reasonable doubt that subject perceives something which is F when properties are mutually supportive themselves, then evident that subject is something w. what F is - (but not as F, e.g. thief) - therefore not de re.
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 89
Immanent knowledge/Gombocz: is only believed knowledge and not a known knowledge like with a transcendent being - mediate minimal knowledge: W1) justified by exactly one truth that it is true - indirect ignorance: of less than one truth. Minimal Knowledge: A person knows that he/she believes at least one truth is justified.
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II 92
Socrates: "I know that I know nothing: common sense: he knows much more: e.g.: the name of his wife, etc. - Vs: there is no Gettier-justification for that (bona validitate, not only bona fide) It is about that he believes his proposition justified, whether he knows them or not.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Knowledge



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29