Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
II 327
Free will/values/action/Nozick: if action is values-led, is there then perhaps no free will? - What would you choose: the best or free will?
II 332
The parallel between action and belief results in nothing enlightening about free will.
II 355ff
Self-choice/freedom/Nozick: Thesis: freedom must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is itself something chosen. - Only something that grows out of a chosen being, will not bind us. - (It will let us free). - But if the being is selected, how should it be inevitable then? - (.> Self-selection II 105 Nozick: Thesis: we are searching for it itself partially .)
II 358
Nozick: Thesis: We are not self-choosers. - E.g. someone may desire not to be a self-chooser. - Then he will wish that a chain of wishes ends in a permanent wish. - It seems that he cannot find one. - Does he has to wish that he himself is still present at the end of the chain?
II 358
We simulate the self-choice partially.
II 360
A self-chooser in my situation would not choose to be in my situation. - Then, it may be part of our nature, not to be a self-chooser. - Even without self choice we can choose freely within external borders.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

> Counter arguments against Nozick

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-28