Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 133
Free Will/freedom/McGinn: Problem: to find a marking of the modality of freedom (freedom modality) that reveals in how far free voting is possible: This relates to a specific (inherent) human capacity. If an object has an expressible force with modal terms, it will have its basis in certain properties of the objects. This force depends on the nature of what has the power. Accordingly freedom modality must have an internal nature and characteristics of the actor, which are probably related to his brain.
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I 139
Soul/McGinn: Is our supernatural soul determined, or is it not? The question is therefore only postponed. God himself would face the dilemma.
Thesis: Freedom is always freedom of something.
((s) "result ratio"/McGinn/(s): = connection between the elements, which correspond to a logical sequence).
An action is not in a result ratio to the relevant set of facts, if it could have turned out differently.
Problem: The critical question is whether the concept of freedom requires only with regard to some of the facts or in respect of all a ratio of not succeeding.
If one defines all the physical facts, does one define all the decisions as well?
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I 145
McGinn Thesis: the ordinary concept of freedom requires a psychic but not a physical non-result ratio.
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I 154/55
The problem of knowledge is reminiscent of the problem of free will, which also has a kind of stimulus independence. Decisions come into being on own accord, they are not mere effects.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-24