Books on Amazon
Freedom of Will/Laws of Nature/violate Laws of Nature/Lewis: the fact that we apparently can violate the Laws of Nature depends on the assumption of an intermediate determinism. - The thesis that we sometimes willingly do what we are predetermined to do and that we might act differently in such cases, although the history and the laws of nature determine that we will not act differently. - Compatibilism: thesis that the soft determinism might be true, but there may be a physical foundation for a predetermination. - E.g. I could have raised a hand - then I would have a violated a Law of Nature - This is assumed here only for the sake of the argument of soft determinism.
Important argument: it does not follow, however, that there is something that is both a law of nature and broken. - For broken laws of nature are a contradiction in adjecto.
The assumption here serves the differentiation of two theses: weak thesis: an actually unbroken law could have been broken. - Strong: I can break laws of nature. - Important argument: if no act of mine is a law of nature breaking event, then it could not be true that I had broken a law of nature. - ((s) not "as long as ...").
Freedom of will/break laws of nature/Lewis: E.g. Assuming I raised my hand 10 minutes ago, although it was predetermined that I should not raise it. - Then there was a time before that when the laws were broken. - Important argument: then the causation is the other way around. - The breaking of the laws caused the raising of the hand. - (see above "miracle"). - But the act itself is not the miracle - therefore you do not need any supernatural powers for moderate determinism. - Problem: the effect would precede the cause. - Nevertheless, right counterfactual dependence pattern.
Lewis: distinction act/event. - It is the act that causes the event of breaking laws. - The act does not falsify a law but only a conjunction of history and law.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991