|Acts of will: A. The expression is sometimes used to characterize an action and to be distinguished from others, e.g. unconscious actions. B. In attempting to describe inner processes, some authors consider acts of will as events that precede an action. Here, other authors argue that there is a risk of regress if an act of will is to be assumed again in order to form an act of will. C. The expression act of will may be used to more accurately determine the formation of a mental state in experiments, e.g. in the experiments of B. Libet. See also will, free will, actions, consciousness, unconscious._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Vs"Acts of Will"/Geach: attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs)-Vs: "ascription theory" ("ascriptivism", Oxford) -
Ascriptivism/Oxford: Thesis: saying that an action is voluntary is not a description of the action, but an attribution.
"All he said"/Oxford: Thesis: this would not be about description but about "confirmation". GeachVs: such theories can be invented by the dozen. - The actual distinction to be observed is the one between naming and predication. - VsAscription Theory: condemning a thing by calling it "bad" must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also be done without condemnation. - Neither can "done deliberately" be characterized by attribution of responsibility or "being imposed" without describing the act as such first._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Logic Matters Oxford 1972