Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Essence, philosophy: the essence of an object is understood to mean one or more properties without which the object is inconceivable. Critics argue that such necessary properties can only be attributed to concepts, but not to empirical objects. See also features, essentialism, ultimate justification, properties, metaphysics, concepts, necessity de re, substance.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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I 258
Essential/Simons: what exists, exists essentially. - But it does not exist necessarily - Solution: Assuming that E.g. whatever is a human, must be a human.
Essential/Simons: = "relatively necessary"- It is essential for Cicero that he exists. Necessary/Wiggins: should distinguish these cases.
I 261
Trivial essential/Simons: E.g. to be colored if red, e.g. to be self-identical, e.g. to exist, E.g. "to be like that 2 + 2 = 4" - essential attributes: are no "mere facts" ("brute facts"), but an object has them by virtue of the fact that it belongs to a certain type. - It is not accidental for an object of a given type, that it has the characteristics which underlie the type.
I 284
Normal/essential/middle course/Simons: "normal part of a normal thing of a type" - Middle course between simple and essential part. - This is often forgotten by philosophers. - (s) takes type as the fundamental concept. - But no formal theory. - Normality: perhaps starting from wellformedness . - Woltersdorff: E.g. music piece, performance. - SimonsVs: does not work because of transitivity of identity. - Solution/(s): Type.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-24