Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Essence, philosophy: the essence of an object is understood to mean one or more properties without which the object is inconceivable. Critics argue that such necessary properties can only be attributed to concepts, but not to empirical objects. See also features, essentialism, ultimate justification, properties, metaphysics, concepts, necessity de re, substance._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Daniel Dennett on Essence - Dictionary of Arguments
I 276 Essence/Nature/Dennett: Nothing that is so complicated that it is interesting can have an essence. ((s) Reason: if it consists of several parts, it can only have developed gradually, while discarding useless parts.) Therefore, it was not essential at any time. Of course, not even at the present time. I 565 Example Vending Machine: A beverage vending machine that recognizes quarter dollar coins is later shipped to Brazil, where it accepts certain local coins. Thesis: The environment creates the meaning. Meaning/function/evolution/Dennett: the importance is how the function at the moment of their creation is still nothing definite! Example: a zoo of frogs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then? I 569 DennettVsEssentialism: Essentialism has dissolved the vending machine into nothingness. Similarly: E.g. frog: would have tried to catch food pellets in the wild just the same if they had crossed his path. Disjunction: in some ways "fly or pellets" is a natural kind of frogs. They do not naturally make a distinction between pelkets and flys. On the other hand, disjunction is not a natural kind: it does not occur in nature. >Disjunction, >Essentialism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18