Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Graeser I 190
Value/Validation/Lewis: These values ​​should be considered as feeling, believing, desiring - ultimately desire of desire - HarmanVsLewis: 1) intrinsic desire of a higher level misleading. "Desire" has the meaning of intention and is, just like any intention, already self-referential.
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I 191
FrankfurtVsHarman: risk of blurring the distinction between the goal (s) and the means, and thus committing oneself to the assumption that goals are equipped with means in a certain way and that’s how we come across them.
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Schw I 185
Value/ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: values are not inherent in the validated events, but in us. In our wishes - Problem: just because you want something, it’s not necessarily good - Solution: Wishes 2nd stage: desire not to want to smoke - best theory: dispositional - Problem: latent relativism.
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Schw I 187
LewisVsUtilitarism: neglects perspective.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25