﻿ David M. Armstrong on Probability Distribution - Dictionary of Arguments

# Dictionary of Arguments

Probability distribution: A probability distribution is the distribution of the probabilities for discrete individual events in a given experimental setup or situation. It is given by a probability function. While a uniform distribution is to be expected for a dice, the distribution of e.g. the expected body sizes of a human population will be concentrated around a mean value. See also probability function.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
III 29f
Probability / Probability Laws / Armstrong: relative frequency does not have to depict the Probability Law - each occurring event itself may be unlikely - infinite sequences: here you can make the limit of relative frequencies - but no solution - Regularity Theory: must assume a Law fo Probability for each event: absurd - "indefinite improbability" / Lewis / Armstrong: the relative frequency wrongly maps the prblty law - distribution: No distib. is impossible, therefore therefore, the law seems to allow any - real Probability Law: here no property D through which the atom disintegrates when the property is present.
III 31
Probability Laws / Armstrong: cannot be identified with molecular facts of distributions - WProbability Laws are Natural Laws that do not logically supervene on facts.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

> Counter arguments against Armstrong

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-19