Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Perception, philosophy: perceptions are conscious or unconscious processings of changes of state or events in the environment or within a living organism. Perceptions are happening in the present. Memories and imaginations are not perceptions. In language usage the expression of perception is used both for the process of perception and for the perceived. See also stimuli, sensations, sense perceptions, computation, memory, ideas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Wilfrid Sellars on Perception - Dictionary of Arguments
I XL Perception/Sellars: includes thoughts - but is not cognitive as such. >Consciousness/Sellars, >Thinking/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars, >Cognition, >Knowledge, >World/Thinking. Clarity: needs something non-cognitive. >Mapping, >Presentation. I 43 Perception/Sellars: might be explained by molecular behavior, but not by analyzing the speech behavior - and therefore not by sense data as an intermediate instance between being and appearance. >Sense data, >Language behavior, >Behavior, >Appearance. I 99: Impression/Sellars: that there is something. - Thought: that something will appear. Perception: as if there would be something. I 103 Perception/Sellars: right question: what would correspond, for example, with electromagnetic concepts in a micro theory of sentient organisms. Not: how do impressions and electro mechanics fit together. There is not only behavior, but also inner episodes. Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable symptoms in behavior. >Intersubjectivity, >Language community, >Observation language. Impressions: are states. But not physiological. >Physical/psychic. Impressions are not objects. --- Graeser I 46 Perception/Sellars/Graeser: adverbial: he preceives reddish. >Cf. >Adverbial analysis._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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> Counter arguments against Sellars
> Counter arguments in relation to Perception
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20