Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Perception/Sellars: includes thoughts - but is not cognitive as such. - Clarity: needs something non-cognitive.
I 43
Perception/Sellars: might be explained by molecular behavior, but not by analyzing the speech behavior - and therefore not by sense data as an intermediate instance between being and appearance.
I 99:
Impression/Sellars: that there is something. - Thought: that something will appear. - Perception: as if there would be something.
I 103
Perception/Sellars: right question: what would correspond, for example, with electromagnetic concepts in a micro theory of sentient organisms - (not: how do impressions and electro mechanics fit together). - Not only behavior, also inner episodes - impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable symptoms in behavioral impressions: states. (But not physiological). - Impressions are not objects.
Graeser I 46
Perception/Sellars/Graeser: adverbial: he preceives reddish.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26