Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Perception, philosophy: perceptions are conscious or unconscious processings of changes of state or events in the environment or within a living organism. Perceptions are happening in the present. Memories and imaginations are not perceptions. In language usage the expression of perception is used both for the process of perception and for the perceived. See also stimuli, sensations, sense perceptions, computation, memory, ideas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Perception - Dictionary of Arguments
Skirbekk Wahrheitstheorien Frankurt/M 1996 I 28 Meanings are in the head (SearleVsPutnam), because perception is self-referential. Perception itself provides the fulfillment conditions. - - - Skirbekk I 78ff Perception/Searle: we perceive the whole house, not just facades, but that is no inference. Perception is linked to a representation system (e.g. language). > E.g. Barn facades/Goldman, > Reliability Theory/Goldman; > more autors on Reliability Theory. - - - Searle II 296 Perception/Searle: perception is nailed to the world: by the causal self-referentiality of intentional content. ((s) The perception delivers the satisfaction conditions that the object must have.) Name/proper name/Searle: here there is no intentional causation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt 1977 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Perception
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-17