Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 13
Perception/"cognitive space"/McGinn: is different for different organisms. E.g. fish cannot perceive much of the world we live in.
I 55
Perception/subjectivity/McGinn: subjectivity exists in the secondary properties, the colors - not in the way as they impress our introspection ability.
II 74
Perception/McGinn: the perception of yellow is probably existentially dependent on what is happening in the neurons of the visual cortex. But it is not true that these neural processes are part of the experience.
Our states of consciousness do not have an internal structure that is defined by their physical foundations.
A state of consciousness does not consist of neural components.
II 164
McGinn: Thesis: I claim something much more radical: states of consciousness itself must be allowed a hidden aspect. The conscious perception of yellow includes more than just the way how it looks for us. It has height, depth and internal complexity. Consciousness is like an iceberg.
II 170
Perception/McGinn: has properties that go beyond the phenomenal area. When describing a seen object, the perception still contains a component which goes beyond that what is perceived. (> Blindsight).

C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vern├╝nftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? M├╝nchen 2001

> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to Perception

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26