|Perception, philosophy: perceptions are conscious or unconscious processings of changes of state or events in the environment or within a living organism. Perceptions are happening in the present. Memories and imaginations are not perceptions. In language usage the expression of perception is used both for the process of perception and for the perceived. See also stimuli, sensations, sense perceptions, computation, memory, ideas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Perception/"cognitive space"/McGinn: is different for different organisms. E.g. fish cannot perceive much of the world we live in.
Perception/subjectivity/McGinn: subjectivity exists in the secondary properties, the colors - not in the way as they impress our introspection ability.
Perception/McGinn: the perception of yellow is probably existentially dependent on what is happening in the neurons of the visual cortex. But it is not true that these neural processes are part of the experience.
Our states of consciousness do not have an internal structure that is defined by their physical foundations.
A state of consciousness does not consist of neural components.
McGinn: Thesis: I claim something much more radical: states of consciousness itself must be allowed a hidden aspect. The conscious perception of yellow includes more than just the way how it looks for us. It has height, depth and internal complexity. Consciousness is like an iceberg.
Perception/McGinn: has properties that go beyond the phenomenal area. When describing a seen object, the perception still contains a component which goes beyond that what is perceived. (> Blindsight)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001