Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth makers, philosophy: Some theories assume that, in the case of true statements, there must be something that is the reason why they are true, the so-called truth makers. Opponents of the truth maker theories represent the view that these truth makers are ultimately a repetition of the description of a state of affairs in other words, whereby a description cannot be made true by another description. One problem is the specification of truth makers when it comes to statements about non-existence. See also reason, justification, truth, facts, universals, natural laws, negation, causality, causal theory, causal explanation, ontology, non-existence, non-factualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P.F. Strawson on Truthmakers - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 194 Truthmaker/Strawson: if the situation is the subject, it is not the situation that makes the statement true. Fact: is a non-linguistic term (therefore not subject).(1) >Facts/Strawson. 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 - - - Strawson II 20ff Truthmaker/Strawson: facts make assertions true, not things. II 252 Truthmaker/VsAustin: that the cat has mange, is not made true by the cat (as a thing), but by the condition of the cat (the fact). II 257 Truthmaker/Strawson: e.g. language with "plate" (Wittgenstein, PI) would be just as conventional, but those alleged pseudo entities that make the statements true (facts), would not be among the non-linguistic correlates. - ((s) the world wouldn’t be emptier.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Truthmakers
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16