|Truth makers, philosophy: Some theories assume that, in the case of true statements, there must be something that is the reason why they are true, the so-called truth makers. Opponents of the truth maker theories represent the view that these truth makers are ultimately a repetition of the description of a state of affairs in other words, whereby a description cannot be made true by another description. One problem is the specification of truth makers when it comes to statements about non-existence. See also reason, justification, truth, facts, universals, natural laws, negation, causality, causal theory, causal explanation, ontology, non-existence, non-factualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|EMD II 89
Make true/Truth Maker/Dummett: it is not to be fixed language-independently, what that would be. - Counterfactual conditionals: here there is no truth-maker - i.e. they can not be "barely true". - There must be a corresponding indicative sentence, which makes them true.
Problem: we do not know how the ability to decide the truth would have to look like, in that case._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989