|Truth makers, philosophy: Some theories assume that, in the case of true statements, there must be something that is the reason why they are true, the so-called truth makers. Opponents of the truth maker theories represent the view that these truth makers are ultimately a repetition of the description of a state of affairs in other words, whereby a description cannot be made true by another description. One problem is the specification of truth makers when it comes to statements about non-existence. See also reason, justification, truth, facts, universals, natural laws, negation, causality, causal theory, causal explanation, ontology, non-existence, non-factualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Horwich I 463
make true / truthmaker / Davidson: the totality of the evidence makes sentences or theories true - but not a thing, no experience, no surface stimuli, not even the world makes sentences true.
Rorty IV 49
make true / truthmaker / Davidson / Rorty: there is no relation of "truth-making" between sentences and non-sentences._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000