|Truth value: The truth value is that what is attributed to a statement or an interpreted logical formula with regard to whether it is true or false. In classical logic, there are two truth values, true and false. In multi-valued logics there can be three to infinitely many truth values. In the latter case, these are often regarded as probabilities. For trivalent logics, the third value is often "indeterminate", "neither true nor false" or "neither proved nor disproved". See also negation, strong negation, weak negation, intuitionism, probability, fuzzy logic, extensionality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Crispin Wright on Truth Values - Dictionary of Arguments
Definition designated value/vagueness/Sorites/Wright: "a is F" has an designated value if "F" is a less misleading description as "non-F" - problem: to identify the last final object at one end of the spectrum, for which "a is F" has a designated value. -> Bivalence/Wright._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008