Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth value: The truth value is that what is attributed to a statement or an interpreted logical formula with regard to whether it is true or false. In classical logic, there are two truth values, true and false. In multi-valued logics there can be three to infinitely many truth values. In the latter case, these are often regarded as probabilities. For trivalent logics, the third value is often "indeterminate", "neither true nor false" or "neither proved nor disproved". See also negation, strong negation, weak negation, intuitionism, probability, fuzzy logic, extensionality.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 51
Truth/the truth/Frege: all phrases denote "truth": because there are no different truths for different sentences, so as it is always the same truth that various accounts are true - analogy: sentences denote the truth, as number names name numbers - PriorVsFrege: false analogy: does not work with propositional attitude: "X believes that p" does not have to be wrong if p is false - (s) while different argument values provide other function values, one can attribute to the other any belief-attitudes (also false) without prejudging with it, if he can believe it - (i.e. whether the compound sentence gets wrong).
I 6§
Truth value/Prior: so we make up the term "truth value" for what we describe as identical if the condition (0) is true: (0) Efy i.e. "If f then y and if y then f" (spelling Lesniewski: E = equivalence) - because truth value is the description of the identical, truht value itself is not the "signified" (VsFrege).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

> Counter arguments against Prior

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-22