Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth value: The truth value is that what is attributed to a statement or an interpreted logical formula with regard to whether it is true or false. In classical logic, there are two truth values, true and false. In multi-valued logics there can be three to infinitely many truth values. In the latter case, these are often regarded as probabilities. For trivalent logics, the third value is often "indeterminate", "neither true nor false" or "neither proved nor disproved". See also negation, strong negation, weak negation, intuitionism, probability, fuzzy logic, extensionality.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 11 f
Def Truth Value/Frege/Dummett: of the sentence: the reference - the (Fregean) " Bedeutung" ("meaning") of the sentence.
I 20f
Dummett: E.g. assuming the condition for true/Fals would be stated, but the two truth values ​​were only marked with A and B, then it would be impossible to figure out which one, A or B, stood for t.
One would have to recognize at least in a sample sentence what weight the speakers assign to the assertoric statement of this sentence.
EMD II 112
Def Not-designated Truth Value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be wrong - designated truth value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be true - this is irrelevant for atomic sentences, only relevant for the way they contribute to a complex sentence - i.e. what the condition for an designated truth value for a composite sentence is - the truth value of the whole sentence does not arise simply from the truth value of the sub-sentences - or the subsentences do not only contribute their own truth value - or if we had a meaning theory for the whole language, perhaps we might not be able to explain the meanings of the logical constants by verification of the subsentences - (three formulations for the same fact).
Dum III 20
Truth Value/Dummett: not by property of statements, but by behavior - compared to bet/command: requires: antecedent in the power of the receiver:
II 21
Gap: if the child does not go out, it cannot have forgotten the jacket - "necessary": = material conditional: no gap.
III 20
Meaning/Truth Value/Bet/Command/Dummett: Asymmetry: disobedience clearly leads to the right of disapproval - obedience does not lead to the right of reward (gap).
Consequence: truth values are more likely to be extracted from bets (win/lose) than from command/behavior.
III 28
Designated Truth Value/Truth Value/Dummett: true or conditional with false antecedent (EFQ, e.g. falso quodlibet) not-designated truth value: wrong or nonexistent object.
Valid/Multi-valued logic: the formulas that have a designated truth value for each allocation.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-21