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Def Truth Value/Frege/Dummett: of the sentence: the reference - the (Fregean) " Bedeutung" ("meaning") of the sentence.
Dummett: E.g. assuming the condition for true/Fals would be stated, but the two truth values were only marked with A and B, then it would be impossible to figure out which one, A or B, stood for t.
One would have to recognize at least in a sample sentence what weight the speakers assign to the assertoric statement of this sentence.
EMD II 112
Def Not-designated Truth Value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be wrong - designated truth value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be true - this is irrelevant for atomic sentences, only relevant for the way they contribute to a complex sentence - i.e. what the condition for an designated truth value for a composite sentence is - the truth value of the whole sentence does not arise simply from the truth value of the sub-sentences - or the subsentences do not only contribute their own truth value - or if we had a meaning theory for the whole language, perhaps we might not be able to explain the meanings of the logical constants by verification of the subsentences - (three formulations for the same fact).
Dum III 20
Truth Value/Dummett: not by property of statements, but by behavior - compared to bet/command: requires: antecedent in the power of the receiver:
Gap: if the child does not go out, it cannot have forgotten the jacket - "necessary": = material conditional: no gap.
Meaning/Truth Value/Bet/Command/Dummett: Asymmetry: disobedience clearly leads to the right of disapproval - obedience does not lead to the right of reward (gap).
Consequence: truth values are more likely to be extracted from bets (win/lose) than from command/behavior.
Designated Truth Value/Truth Value/Dummett: true or conditional with false antecedent (EFQ, e.g. falso quodlibet) not-designated truth value: wrong or nonexistent object.
Valid/Multi-valued logic: the formulas that have a designated truth value for each allocation.
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989