Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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III 118
Truth Theory/Dummett: presupposes understanding of the metalanguage.
- - -
Horwich I 459
Truth/Truth Theory/Truth Conditions/Dummett/Rorty: it could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the contents of the right hand side of the T-sentence. - The T-sentence explains nothing, if the meta language contains the object language - and then the same is true when meta language and object language are separated.
Davidson: no single T-sentence says what understanding is, but the whole body.
DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolism: with that he admits that the holism can not explain how the speaker comes to the understanding of individual sentences. - Davidson: Language use is not separable into sub-skills. - The T-sentence embodies no skills - or else we would have to assume mental entities.

Du I
M. Dummett
Urspr√ľnge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Theory



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29