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|EMD II 34
Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. - Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept.
EMD II 35
FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson dito).
EMD II 37
Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that ability to interpret does not equal translation.
Dav I 111
Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning.
Tarski: formal, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable)
Dav II 28f
Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition T-equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truthvalue under all circumstances .
Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention T (provides only true equivalences) when T-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and metalanguage sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the metalanguage must be known - T-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his T-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the T- Theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a T-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true.
Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions).
Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority.
T-Theory: in principle, only for certain occasion correct - problem: for a theory of competence: no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989