|Truth Theory, philosophy: In truth theories, the question is whether and how truth is to be defined. Roughly differentiated are
A. Theories on the correspondence of statements with facts (correspondence theories).
B. Theories of internal consistency within a system of statements (coherence theories).
See also truth definition, truth, truth values, truth predicate, deflationism, disquotationalism, disquotation.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|EMD II 34
Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. - Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept.
EMD II 35
FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson dito).
EMD II 37
Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that ability to interpret does not equal translation.
Dav I 111
Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning.
Tarski: formal, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable)
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 28f
Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition T-equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truthvalue under all circumstances .
Glüer II 29
Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention T (provides only true equivalences) when T-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and metalanguage sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the metalanguage must be known - T-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his T-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the T- Theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a T-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true.
Glüer II 45
Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions).
Glüer II 54/55
Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority.
Glüer II 56
T-Theory: in principle, only for certain occasion correct - problem: for a theory of competence: no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993