Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments
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| Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
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| IV 21ff "True" / ethnocentrism / Rorty: we use our current beliefs in order to decide how to use the expression is true , although "true" can not be defined by those beliefs. - Putnam calls this - "God s point of view" - that is, we trivialize "true", without relativizing it._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. |
Ro I R. Rorty Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Ro II R. Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Ro III R. Rorty Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Ro IV R. Rorty Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993 Ro V R. Rorty Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998 Ro VI R. Rorty Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-24