Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
VI 115
Truth predicate/Quine: is transparent - Quote redemption does not explain the truth predicate, because no eliminability - due to the transparency still information about what it means that a sentence is true. - It is because of the laxity that paradoxes are avoided.
X 31
Truth predicate/Quine: shows the reality right through the sentence. - It reminds us that, although sentences are mentioned, it is still reality what this is about. - ((s)> reverses semantic ascent.)
X 32
Truth predicate/semantic ascent/Quine/(s): truth predicate quasi-reverses semantic ascent, because it ensures that one does not have to talk about language (in semantic ascent). - Quine: it reminds us in the ascent that we’re taking about the world. - By calling the sentence true, we call the snow white. - Truth predicate: reverses the quote marks. - Sentence: just say it in order to assert it - then no quotation marks and no truth predicate. - truth predicate: necessary for generalizations about an infinite number of sentences: E.g. "All sentences of the form p or not p are true". - Truth predicate: restores reference to the object, which was eliminated by the semantic ascent.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

> Counter arguments against Quine

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-21