Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
II 90
Zero digit relation: E.g. Tarski: "true" is the zero digit case of satisfaction: that means, a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence is met. - zero sequence: converges to 0. Example 1, 1/4, 1/9, 1/16, ...
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II 97
Truth/logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives are not determined by their formal logic. -> Holism -> Quine: the distinction between the whole theory and meanings of each statement is useless.
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II 145
"True"/Tarski/Putnam: all writers: the meaning of "true" is detected by any definition that meets the criterion W - the meaning can still be explained by non-semantic vocabulary (descriptive words of the object language and logical vocabulary).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-22