|Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
"True"/Truth-Predicate/Purpose/Generalization/Generality/Quine/Field: (Quine, 1970): above all, the truth-predicate has the role of generalization. - That is his whole value. - Leeds dito. - Field: E.g. "All true sentences of this theory are theorems". - Camp/Grover/Belnap/CGB: (CGB, 1975, dito). E.g.: "There are true sentences that no one will ever have a reason to believe".
Truth-Predicate/Generalization/Truth/Field: E.g. the desire to express only true sentences: "I utter "p" only if p".
E.g. "Not every (of infinitely many) axioms is true". - Or, for example, they are contingent: "Not every had to be true". - N.B.: this is only possible with purely disquotational truth._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994