Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||
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| Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Books on Amazon |
Rorty VI 20 "True"/Davidson: "true" is not a name of a relationship between language statements and the world. In other words: the expression "true" should neither be analyzed nor defined. There is no thing that makes sentences and theories true. "True" is not synonymous with anything at all. Neither with "justified according to our knowledge", nor with "justified by the circumstances in the world". --- K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993 Glüer II 27 Truth-Predicate/Tarski: Problem: DavidsonVsTarski: object language and meta language should contain the predicate true. - The T-predicate defined in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language. Solution/Davidson: do not set up a T-definition at all - instead: T-Theory/Davidson: Reinterpretation of the convention T as a criterion of appropriateness for T-theories of natural languages. --- Glüer II 28 T-Predicate/Tarski: any predicate that delivers correct translations is a T-predicate. - This presupposes meaning in order to explicate truth. --- Glüer II Truth-predicate/TarskiVsDavidson: provides a structural description of a language whose translation is known. - The T-predicate does not contribute to the truth theory. - It is not interpreted in Tarski. - ((s) we do not know what truth is - T-Predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: is interpreted a priori.) - ((s) we already know what truth is.) - Definition interprets/(s): know what a word means. --- Rorty IV 22 True/Davidson/Rorty: does not correspond to any relationship between linguistic expressions and the world. - No correspondence._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. |
D I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 D III D. Davidson Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 D IV D. Davidson Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Ro I R. Rorty Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Ro II R. Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Ro III R. Rorty Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Ro IV R. Rorty Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993 Ro V R. Rorty Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998 Ro VI R. Rorty Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Ro I R. Rorty Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Ro VI R. Rorty Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-24