|Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
|Horwich I 356
T-predicate / Generalization / Semantic Ascent / Quine (1970): the T-predicate is nto needed, to generalize e.g. "Dick is mortal," "Tom s ...", ((s) that goes with "x ") but for the generalization of "Tom is mortal or not mortal." ((s) If "a or b" is true, then a is true or b is true or both., where "a" stands for a whole sentence and not "x" for an individual). - Camp/Grover/Belnap/CVGBVsQuine: without quantification over sentences, where a characteristic (truth) is attributed. (BelnapVsQuine, GroverVsQuine, CampVsQuine)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
|Grover, D. L.
Gro I D. Grover A Prosentential Theory of Thruth Princeton New Jersey 1992
D.L.Grover, J.L.Kamp, N.D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)
See external reference in the individual contributions.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994