Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Horwich I 356
T-predicate / Generalization / Semantic Ascent / Quine (1970): the T-predicate is nto needed, to generalize e.g. "Dick is mortal," "Tom s ...", ((s) that goes with "x ") but for the generalization of "Tom is mortal or not mortal." ((s) If "a or b" is true, then a is true or b is true or both., where "a" stands for a whole sentence and not "x" for an individual). - Camp/Grover/Belnap/CVGBVsQuine: without quantification over sentences, where a characteristic (truth) is attributed. (BelnapVsQuine, GroverVsQuine, CampVsQuine)

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover A Prosentential Theory of Thruth Princeton New Jersey 1992

D.L.Grover, J.L.Kamp, N.D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.
Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-21