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|Berka I 403
Truth-Definition/Tarski: in artificial languages: not solvable if they contain variables of an arbitrarily high order - Solution: truth-concept as undefined basic concept - it can be used in a "deductive discipline".
Berka I 477
Truth/Truth-Definition/language/Tarski: would the language be finite, it took just a list to fill in the scheme.
Horwich I 119
Truth-Definition/Tarski: has other interesting consequences: we can use it to prove the semantic sentence of contradiction and the semantic sentence of contradiction - but not the corresponding logical sentences, because these contain the term "true". (They belong to the propositional calculus) - also, it is shown that truth never coincides with provability - because there are true statements that are not provable.
Tarski I 156
Truth/Tarski: we get the truth-definitions simply because of the definition of fulfillment:
Definition fulfillment/Tarski: fulfillment is a relationship between any object and propositional function - an object satisfies a function when the function is a true statement, when replacing the free variable with the name of object - Snow satisfies the propositional function "x is white" - Vs: that is circular, because "true" occurs in the defintion of fulfillment - Solution: fulfillment itself must be defined recursively - if we have the fulfillment, it relates by itself on the statements themselves - a statement is either satisfied by all objects, or by none.
Tarski I 162
Truth Definition/Tarski: not circular, because the conditions under which statements of the form "if ... then" are true, are illogical.
Tarski I 163
Truth-Schema/Tarski: correct: (T)X is true if and only if p. - wrong: (T") X is true if and only if p is true ((s) Vs: here 'true' occurs twice) - Tarsk: Confusion of name and object) statements and their names) - ((s) p is the statement itself, not assertion of its truth.)> redundancy theory.
Tarski I 169
Truth-Definition/Tarski: "actually" does not occur, because it does not concern the content - also no assertibility condition because the definition is not epistemologically - epistemologically would be "snow is white" not true.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994