Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
II 29
T-Definition/Tarski-Schema/Contents/Interpreting/Translation/Tarski/Davidson/Glüer: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green. - Such a theory would not be interpretive. - The right side truth conditions have nothing to do with the truth conditions from the left - Problem: the equivalence is purely formal because the truth value is always the same. (Equivalence) solution: menaing holism: a sentence has only meaning in the context - solution/Davidson: T-predicate three-digit: for sentence, speaker, point of time.
---
II 37f
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) ("falsified theory") - The convention T is not sufficiently empirical - ((e) because it's only providing equivalences.)
---
II 65
T-equivalences/Davidson/Glüer: equate conviction and belief.
---
II 40/41
E.g. (TR") for all speakers x, for all t: "It is raining" expressed by x to t is true iff it is raining at t in the surrounding of x. - ((s) That specifies the truth conditions).
---
II 67
Truth/Davidson: intuitive - meaning: non-intuitive - truth: unanalysable basic concept.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Definition



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25