Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 29
T-Definition/Tarski-Schema/Contents/Interpreting/Translation/Tarski/Davidson/Glüer: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green. - Such a theory would not be interpretive. - The right side truth conditions have nothing to do with the truth conditions from the left - Problem: the equivalence is purely formal because the truth value is always the same. (Equivalence) solution: menaing holism: a sentence has only meaning in the context - solution/Davidson: T-predicate three-digit: for sentence, speaker, point of time.
Glüer II 37f
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) ("falsified theory") - The convention T is not sufficiently empirical - ((e) because it's only providing equivalences.)
Glüer II 65
T-equivalences/Davidson/Glüer: equate conviction and belief.
Glüer II 40/41
E.g. (TR") for all speakers x, for all t: "It is raining" expressed by x to t is true iff it is raining at t in the surrounding of x. - ((s) That specifies the truth conditions).
Glüer II 67
Truth/Davidson: intuitive - meaning: non-intuitive - truth: unanalysable basic concept.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Definition

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-20