Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Truth-conditions / solution / Foster: that subset of all the circumstances with which the sentence matches -> possible worlds -> binary relation between sentence and world, conterfactual conditional: "(x) (x is true-of w, if and only if when w would exist, it would be the case that p)" - problem: this is non- extensional! The truth conditional would no longer be true when instead of "p" a material equivalent sentence were used with other truth-conditions.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
J. Foster
II Evans/McDowell (Hg) Truth and Meaning, Oxford 1977
J.Foster Thruth and meaning theory
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26