|Truth conditions: the conditions under which statements, propositions, assertions, etc. are true are called truth conditions. In order to understand a sentence, according to some theories, it is sufficient to know its truth conditions. (Compare M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt, 1992, p. 20). According to these theories, one can understand not only true but also false sentences. See also semantics, sentence meaning, understanding, truth, meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Truth conditions/WB/Field: are characterized by name-object relations and predicate-property relations. - The sentence-proposition-relation is then derived. But this does not mean that we first invent names and predicates, and then put them together.
In a reliability theory, truth values can be treated as theoretical terms (TT) of a "theory of the indication" (pointing).
Truth Conditions/WB/Content/Meaning/Field: not all terms of meaning and content need truth conditions. Deflationism must exclude a central role of truth conditions.
Contents/truth condition/deflationism/Field: the content must not be linked to truth conditions, so that the following is possible: - E.g. antiquity: believed "Zeus throws thunderkeys". - Since the sentence is not true, it would not have any content when linking to truth conditions. - Solution: Use, Indication, Reliability - N.B.: Reliability is not part of the truth conditions. - truth condition: it is not to decide what were the truth conditions for "sunrise" according to geocentric beliefs . -> Deflationism: "true-like"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980