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|EMD II 72
Truth Conditions/Tr.c./Dummett: are assumed given - but only for each type of speech act - theory of power must then distinguish between question, command, etc. - being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct).
EMD II 95
Truth Conditions/tr.c./Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (truth conditions for the attribution of skills).
EMD II 100
Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know if you cannot tell when they are satisfied.
Dum III 17
Sense/Frege: explanation of sense with truth conditions - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: "Under which circumstances"
DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that P is true means - Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P. - VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained - VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence.
Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! - Vs: truth conditions not always recognizable, even if met. - VsVs: requires only knowledge of the conditions, not knowing of the fulfillment.
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989