Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth conditions: the conditions under which statements, propositions, assertions, etc. are true are called truth conditions. In order to understand a sentence, according to some theories, it is sufficient to know its truth conditions. (Compare M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt, 1992, p. 20). According to these theories, one can understand not only true but also false sentences. See also semantics, sentence meaning, understanding, truth, meaning.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Truth Conditions/Tr.c./Dummett: are assumed given - but only for each type of speech act - theory of power must then distinguish between question, command, etc. - being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct).
Truth Conditions/tr.c./Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (truth conditions for the attribution of skills).
EMD II 100
Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know if you cannot tell when they are satisfied.
Dum III 17
Sense/Frege: explanation of sense with truth conditions - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: "Under which circumstances"
DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that P is true means - Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P. - VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained - VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence.
III 122
Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! - Vs: truth conditions not always recognizable, even if met. - VsVs: requires only knowledge of the conditions, not knowing of the fulfillment.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-04-20