|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation (> timeless sentence).
Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason - otherwise lie and deception would be excluded.
Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use - VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea.
Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - Tugendhat VsMeta Language - Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary.
Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless.
The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992