Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability.
A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence.
B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas.
C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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J.R. Searle on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
Perler I 142 True/false/Searle: true and false are meta-intentional predicates. There are not only in the metalanguage. >Meta-language, >Object-language, >Intentionality/Searle. - - - III 177 Truth/Searle: all true statements about the world can be asserted without contradiction at the same time. Yes, if they cannot be asserted without contradiction at the same time, they cannot all be true. Of course, there are always problems of vagueness, indeterminacy, family similarity, open texture, contextual dependency, incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, idealization, under determination of the theory by the evidence. >Context dependence, >Incommensurability, >Ambiguity, >Vagueness, >Idealization. But these are characteristics of our systems of representation, not of reality independent of representation! Truth in a scheme is a property of the scheme and not a real inconsistency. >Reality/Searle, VsSearle: >Reality/Seel, >Representation/Searle, >Underdetermination/Quine. III 185 Truth/Reality/Searle: there is a simple but deep reason why truth and reality cannot coincide as the naive external realist must believe, according to many philosophers. Every representation a forteriori and every true representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others! They are always within the framework of a certain conceptual scheme and from a certain point of view. ((s) QuineVs, DavidsonVs). There is an infinite number of different points of view (Searle pro). Each representation has an aspect. But an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view. III 218 Truth/Searle: truth applies to statements, truth is a term that implies evaluation, trustworthiness and quoting gives us a criterion of trustworthiness. >Disquotation, >Truth definitions, >Truth theories._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |