|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability.
A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence.
B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas.
C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Truth/Rorty: love of truth not as love for something non-human, but as relation to the fellow human beings. Love of truth as affable willingness to talk made the quasi-object as the target of a search (Platonic idea of the natural order or universally valid convictions, Habermas) entirely superfluous. II 116f
Truth/Art/ethics/Rorty: with Davidson, I believe that the distinction true/false can also be applied to sentences of the type "Yeats was a great poet" and "democracy is better than tyranny". III 84 ff
Semantic theory of truth/Tarski: Truth leads back to justification. V 26ff
Truth: absolute concept: in the following sense: true for me, but not for you... in my culture, but not in yours, true back then, but not today such statements are strange and pointless.
It makes more sense: justified for me but not for you.
Justification: relative! Justification is a criterion for truth.
Truth: not a goal of research! A goal is something of which you can know if you are heading towards or coming away from it. VI 7
Truth: Property of sentences!
Truth/existence/Rorty: Of course it was true in the past that women should not be suppressed, just like the planetary orbits were true! Truth is ahistorical, but this is not so because true statements are made true by ahistorical entities! Vi 327
Horwich I 444
Pragmatism/James/Davidson/Rorty: 1) Truth is not used explanatorily. - 2) beliefs are explained by causal relation. - 3) There are no true-makers. - 4) If no true-makers, then no dispute between realism and anti-realism that accepts this true-makers.
Horwich I 454
Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of satisfaction or something else. - We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. - So we are rid of the correspondence theory.
Horwich I 456
Truth/Putnam: if they were not a property, the truth conditions would be everything you could know about them - (Putnam pro truth as a property - (PutnamVsField?). - Putnam: Then our thoughts would not be thoughts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994