Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Rorty I 309
Concept of Truth/Truth/Putnam/Rorty: the concept of truth has certain properties. Putnam: if a statement is true, then its logical consequences are also true, when two statements are true, then their conjunction is also true. If a statement is now true, then it is always.
Horwich I 394
Truth: ... has to do with speaker-use (success), not with what is going on "in the head" - (> verification degrees, confirmation degrees). - Meaning/Putnam: is also a function of the reference (not only in the head). - Reference/Putnam: is determined by social practices and actual physical paradigms.
Horwich I 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist (= reductionist) or cultural relativist.
Horwich I 456
Truth/Putnam: if it was not a property, the truth conditions were everything you could know about them - (((s) Putnam pro truth as a property -> PutnamVsField?) - Putnam: Then our thoughts would not be thoughts.
Putnam III 96f
Truth/Deconstructivism/PutnamVsDerrida: (Derrida: "The concept of truth itself is inconsistent but indispensable") - PutnamVs: the failure of a large number of contradictory statements is something else than a failure of the concept of truth itself - Truth/Putnam. Not "what I would believe if I continue researching". - Putnam: the philosophy of language got only troubled because they believed that they could clear out the normative.
II 204f
Truth/PutnamVsRorty: when some ideas "pay out", then there is the question of the nature of this accuracy.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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> Counter arguments in relation to Truth

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-27