Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability.
A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence.
B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas.
C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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A. Prior on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
I 21 Truth/belief/Prior: Truth cannot only be applied to propositions, but also to belief: logical form: "(X thinks that) p and p" (bracket). - But determination of truth does not ascribe a property to any proposition (always facts are decisive). >Propositions, >Facts. A fact is possible without a believed proposition. >Beliefs, >Thinking. Problem/Moore: if no one believes that the belief must be false, even if it would be correct if someone believes that! ((s) This is due to non-existence). PriorVs: this is a misconception of belief as a relation to facts. >Relation theory. I 98 Truth/PriorVsTarski: you could also see it as an adverb (quasi-property) instead regarding it as a property: E.g. "when someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully". Cf. >Truth/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski. Prior: with me there is no mention, only use. >Quotation marks, >Quotation/disquotation, >Disquotation scheme, >Mention/use. Prior: the sentencenly >snow is white" is only about snow, not about truth. - There is no metalanguage. >Metalanguage. PriorVsTarski: for me the truth is as much about the things that someone thinks, fears, etc. - Then you can also think that you think something wrong. >Thinking, >Self-reference. I 106 Truth/meaning/Buridan: every sentence means that it is true itself (in addition to what else it means). Prior: we have to admit that a sentence can have several meanings at the same time. >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Ambiguity. Then the sentence is non-paradoxically wrong (contradictorily) if it is to mean that it is wrong. - But there is no "secondary meaning" and "principle B". Cf. >Paradoxes._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19