|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Wright I 66
Definiton Truth/Peirce: that what is justified on an ideal border of recognition when all empirical information is obtained.
PutnamVsPeirce: one cannot simply know when one has all the information. Wright dito.
Horwich I 448
Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: Peirce: ideal final stage. - JamesVsPeirce: neglects the mind. - "True of" is no analyzable relation - (at least not between inhomogeneous entities). - Rorty: thus James omitts correspondence. - Dewey: completes the way: only the try to interpose "language" or "ghost", can let intentionality appear interesting._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994