|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|EMD II 185
Truth/Peacocke: two ways: (i) which is expressed in English by "what he said" when you know that the other person was telling the truth - (ii) in the sense how one can claim that ""it is boring" it is true" if someone expresses it at a time when he is bored - ad (ii): can be expressed in existential quantification: "there is a sentence"- ad (i): cannot be expressed by (ii) - (> Say) - solution: say and truth (plus adequacy) must be defined in terms of the actual language - problem: that involves semantic vocabulary - (> Chess: Winning must be defined externally).
Truth/Tarski/actual Language/Peacocke: the concept of truth in this sentence schemes is not the general notion of truth (like e.g. the general concept of winning next to the chess game (Dummett))._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989