Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
EMD II 185
Truth/Peacocke: two ways: (i) which is expressed in English by "what he said" when you know that the other person was telling the truth - (ii) in the sense how one can claim that ""it is boring" it is true" if someone expresses it at a time when he is bored - ad (ii): can be expressed in existential quantification: "there is a sentence"- ad (i): cannot be expressed by (ii) - (> Say) - solution: say and truth (plus adequacy) must be defined in terms of the actual language - problem: that involves semantic vocabulary - (> Chess: Winning must be defined externally).
II 187
Truth/Tarski/actual Language/Peacocke: the concept of truth in this sentence schemes is not the general notion of truth (like e.g. the general concept of winning next to the chess game (Dummett)).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

> Counter arguments against Peacocke
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-18