|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Horwich I 422
Truth / HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability - it involves a relation between an observation or thought and the way things are in the world.
Horwich I 427
idealized acceptability / HarmanVsPutnam: truth can not be identified with idealized acceptability, but because there are trivial but unacceptable truths ._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994