|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.|
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Truth/Goodman: Provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and obedient servant, no severe master.
The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out.
"The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false).
GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised:
""Snow is white" is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white".
Truth/Goodman: is like intelligence exactly what the tests test.
I 146 ff
GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious.
Goodman suggests high acceptability as accuracy scale.
The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter.
Truth/Goodman: We should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form.
Accuracy/Goodman: does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity.
Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement "snow is white" can sometimes be incorrect.
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989