|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.|
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|EMD II 83
Truth/Dummett: comes from the act of asserting - closely related: correctness: saying something true means to say something correct.
EMD II ~ 87
Truth/Dummett: is an objective property of what a speaker says - and this is independent of the knowledge of the speaker or his utterance reasons - Truth explainable by more primitive notion of correctness - (correctness of sentences about the future, question, command).
EMD II 115
Truth/Dummett: still necessary for deductive inferences - def valid/Dummett: an inference that contains truth.
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Dum I 26ff
Correspondence Theory/coherence Theory: meaning prevails over truth - Davidson: Truth prevails over meaning (truth conditions are defined later by the theory). - Dummett both together!
Use/truth/Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes concept of truth superfluous > meaning before truth
Truth/Dummett: better: winning the game - necessary: in addition declare that the goal is winning, not losing! - Part of the concept of truth is the stated goal to only make true statements.
DummettVsFrege: The aim of the truth must be established before claiming, otherwise one could express the same thought, but deny it.
Truth/Dummett: in reality it is mostly about the distinction between designated /non-designated truth values
Truth/meaning/Dummett: "It is true that p if ... iff" is not sufficient - Use: Each conditional must be given a specific meaning. - We must be able to already understand "If P, then it is true that P"
Truth/Dummett: that through which a statement is true is that by which it can be recognized as true
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Putnam II 214
Truth/Dummett: = Justification - Dummett believes in final verification - PutnamVsDummett: merely idealized verification possible. - The assertibility conditions for any sentence are not manageable. - We get to know the meaning conditions by acquiring a practice; that is not an algorithm, they cannot be formalized - hence rationality cannot be formalized either.
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990