Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 56
Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me.
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The T-predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true".
  Object and meta-language should contain the predicate "true".
Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "T-theory".
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) .- Convention T is not sufficiently empirical
The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world.
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K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
II 131
VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism".
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Rorty VI 51
Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional".
A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensonal concept.
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K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
II 28
Interpretation theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning.
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Horwich I 443
Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion.
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Rorty VI 189
Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


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> Counter arguments in relation to Truth



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-28