|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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"True in the other possible world"/Operator/Cresswell: ambiguous: ((lx)Ofx: "is such an x that x f is in the other world" - then: ((lx)Ofx)(s): the thing x (in this world, actual world) has the complex property of being wooden in the other possible world) - ambiguous: a) it is true in the other world that it is true in the other world that the largest wooden building is wooden. This can simply be represented like this: O(O(fs)).
- b) if the parentheses are omitted: OOfs: then it is equivalent to fs. - This is appropriate for (18) and certainly also for all specific descriptions. - Problem: then all the laws of classical logic do not longer apply.
Definition true/Truth/Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: a sentence is true in a possible world iff this world is in the sets of worlds that is its intension (of the sentence). - ((s): inversion of the definition of extension: extension of the sentence: set of worlds in which it is true). Cresswell: therefore one can say that the extension of the sentence is its truth value. (Frege)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984