Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability.
A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence.
B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas.
C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M.J. Cresswell on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
I 128 "True in the other possible world"/Operator/Cresswell: ambiguous: ((lx)Oφx: "is such an x that x φ is in the other world". Then: ((λx)Oφx)(s): the thing x (in this world, actual world) has the complex property of being wooden in the other possible world). Ambiguous: a) it is true in the other world that it is true in the other world that the largest wooden building is wooden. This can simply be represented like this: O(O(φs)). b) if the parentheses are omitted: OOφs: then it is equivalent to φs. This is appropriate for (18) (18) It is true in the other possible world that the largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere is wooden in the other world and certainly also for all specific descriptions. Problem: then all the laws of classical logic do not longer apply. --- II 72 Def true/truth/Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: a sentence is true in a possible world iff this world is in the sets of worlds that is its intension (of the sentence). >Possible world semantics. ((s): inversion of the definition of extension: extension of the sentence: set of worlds in which it is true). >Truth values/Frege. Cresswell: therefore one can say that the extension of the sentence is its truth value. (Frege)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19