Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 128
"True in the other possible world"/Operator/Cresswell: ambiguous: ((lx)Ofx: "is such an x that x f is in the other world" - then: ((lx)Ofx)(s): the thing x (in this world, actual world) has the complex property of being wooden in the other possible world) - ambiguous: a) it is true in the other world that it is true in the other world that the largest wooden building is wooden. This can simply be represented like this: O(O(fs)).
- b) if the parentheses are omitted: OOfs: then it is equivalent to fs. - This is appropriate for (18) and certainly also for all specific descriptions. - Problem: then all the laws of classical logic do not longer apply.
---
II 72
Definition true/Truth/Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: a sentence is true in a possible world iff this world is in the sets of worlds that is its intension (of the sentence). - ((s): inversion of the definition of extension: extension of the sentence: set of worlds in which it is true). Cresswell: therefore one can say that the extension of the sentence is its truth value. (Frege).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


> Counter arguments against Cresswell
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28