Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Horwich I 340
True/Truth/Property/Prosentential Theory/Camp/Grover/Belnap/CGB: even though "true" is not redundant, it does not attribute any property. - E.g. "It-is-not-true-that" Rome is the center of the world, "but it was-true-that" Rome was (is) the center of the world. - Also not redundant: "true": formation of the opposite of a sentence. - "It is not true that". - Problem: E.g. "When the switch is up, the light is on." - For most sentences this is hardly possible.
I 348
Camp/Grover/Belnap: Thesis: truth is not a property.
I 356 f
Truth/Field/CGB: (Field 1972): is the "original purpose" of the concept of truth is to use the expressions of others to draw conclusions about the world.
(I) We say under what circumstances that whicht someone else says is true.
(II) How we get from the belief in the truth of something to a belief about the world.
CGB: yet, no truth property.
I 360
Therefore, it cannot be attributed.
I 363
T-Predicate/Generalization/Quine/CGB: E.g. What is the relation between a sentence and the world if it is true? - That is not possible without T-predicate.
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover A Prosentential Theory of Thruth Princeton New Jersey 1992

D.L.Grover, J.L.Kamp, N.D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.
Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30